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1 Introduction
The notion of truth in virtue of meaning has played a prominent role 
in the moderate empiricist account of the a priori. The central tenet 
of empiricism is the claim that sense experience is the only source 
of knowledge about the world. However, moderate empiricists also 
maintain that the way we know certain truths (viz., a priori truths) 
is different from the way we know empirical truths. In order to con-
ciliate both these claims, empiricists try to show that a priori knowl-
edge, though genuine enough in its own terms, is less substantial, 
less world-involving than knowledge acquired through experience 
– the notion of analyticity is used for such a purpose. But the notion 
of analyticity has been understood in many different ways, some of 
them unsuitable to be used in an account of the a priori, others more 
suitable.1 This is not to say that these notions do not have anything in 
common. There is (or seems to be) a certain semantic phenomenon 
that they all endeavour to capture. Whether this phenomenon is real 
or merely apparent, or whether we manage to capture it with some 
notion of analyticity is not something I will explore here. My only 
purpose is to discuss a notion of analyticity that has played a promi-
nent role in the moderate empiricist account of the a priori; namely 
the notion of truth in virtue of meaning – the so-called metaphysical 
notion of analyticity.2 Here is how A. J. Ayer characterizes this notion 
of analyticity:
1 See Swinburne 1975 for a survey of some of such notions.
2 The distinction between metaphysical and epistemological notions of analy-
ticity has been introduced by Boghossian (1997).
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I think that we can preserve the logical import of Kant’s distinction 
between analytic and synthetic propositions, while avoiding the confu-
sions which mar his actual account of it, if we say that a proposition 
is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the 
symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is determined by 
the facts of experience. (1946: 33)
If there is such a thing as truth in virtue of meanings alone, and if 
a priori knowledge is merely knowledge of analytic truths (in this 
sense), the possibility of a priori knowledge becomes less mysteri-
ous: a priori knowledge is merely knowledge of semantic facts (or of 
conceptual relations between our concepts), and hence purportedly 
not as substantial or world-involving as empirical knowledge.
However, the metaphysical notion of analyticity has been under a 
cloud of suspicion ever since Quine (1951)3 famously attacked its in-
telligibility. Such an attack has been reinforced by Boghossian (1997) 
and more recently by Williamson (2007). Nonetheless, the notion is 
still used in many philosophical circles. My aim is to reinforce this 
sceptical stance. The paper will proceed as follows. I start by briefly 
motivating the metaphysical notion of analyticity as well as the main 
reason to reject it. After this I consider the case of logical truths. I ar-
gue that the fact that logical truths are true under all interpretations 
that preserve their logical form does not in any way provide a reason 
to think that they are made true by their meanings alone, or that 
they are somehow less substantial than empirical truths. I then move 
on to paradigmatic cases of analytic truths, the so-called conceptual 
truths, to conclude that no reason has been given to regard them as 
true in virtue of meanings alone, and a fortiori, as less substantial or 
world-involving than empirical truths. I then consider and reject the 
claim that the analytic/synthetic distinction should instead be re-
garded as a distinction between two types of truth. I claim that if we 
are to make sense of the metaphysical notion of analyticity we have 
to have a less literal understanding of the notion of truth in virtue of 
meanings alone. I provide such an understanding by drawing from 
two-dimensionalist approaches to semantics, and I propose a new 
definition of analyticity according to which a statement expresses 
an analytic truth iff it remains true no matter how the actual world 
turns out to be. I argue that though perfectly intelligible, it is not 
3 See also Quine (1935) and (1954).
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clear whether this notion captures any distinctive semantic phenom-
enon deserving of the name ‘analyticity’, and that even if it does, this 
in no way shows that analytic truths are somehow less substantial or 
cognitively demanding than a posteriori truths – as most empiricists 
have taken them to be.
2 Truth and meaning
In this section I outline the main reason to reject the metaphysical 
notion of analyticity. But before we proceed let us star by briefly 
motivating the notion. According to the metaphysical notion of ana-
lyticity a statement is analytic if and only if it is true in virtue of its 
meaning alone. First, let us agree to put semantic scepticism aside. 
Despite Quine’s stance regarding meaning, I will assume, for the 
sake of the argument, that statements have meanings and that they 
express contents or propositions. Let us now take the following two 
statements:
(1) Brutus killed Caesar or Brutus did not kill Caesar.
(2) Snow is white or snow is not white.
Whatever is responsible for the truth of (1) seems to be what is 
also responsible for the truth of (2). Since the only things that both 
statements have in common are the logical words ‘or’ and ‘not’, it 
is tempting to claim that the truth of such statements depends en-
tirely on the meaning of those words. Thus, we could claim that such 
statements are clear cases of analytic statements in the metaphysical 
sense: they are both true in virtue of their meaning alone.
Now let us take the following statements:
(3) Bachelors are unmarried.
(4) Vixens are female foxes.
These statements are also thought to be true in virtue of their mean-
ing alone, but the reason for this is slightly different from the one 
above. In this case, these statements are thought to be definitional 
in nature in the sense of giving the meaning of a certain word. (3) is 
supposed to give us the meaning of ‘bachelor’, and (4) the meaning 
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of ‘vixen’. But if such statements only determine meanings, then it 
seems that they are in virtue of their meaning alone.
Now, the main reason to question the intelligibility of the meta-
physical notion of analyticity is the fact that it seems to go against a 
central truism regarding the relation between truth and meaning. 
This truism can be stated as follows: for every statement S, S is true 
if and only if (i) S means that p (or expresses the content that p) and 
(ii) p is the case. We may call this the Tarskian Truism.4 It is this appar-
ent clash with the Tarskian truism – hereafter (TT) for short – that 
led Quine to claim that ‘(...) it is nonsense, and the root of much non-
sense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component 
in the truth of any individual statement’ (1951: 42). Meanings seem 
necessary for the truth of a statement. For instance, the statement 
‘Snow is white’ is true, but if instead of expressing the content that 
snow is white it expressed the content that snow is blue, it would 
have been false. The problem here is with the claim that meanings 
alone make statements true. To say that the statement ‘Snow is white’ 
is true in virtue of saying that snow is white is just part of the expla-
nation. For this statement to be true it also has to be the case that 
snow is white. The truth of a statement is a function of its meaning 
and the way the world is. Meanings do not seem to make things 
what they are, statements only express propositions that hold or not 
depending on the way things are. However, according to the meta-
physical notion of analyticity, the way things are seems irrelevant to 
the truth of analytic statements. That is, the truth of such statements 
seems to be exclusively determined by what they express and inde-
pendently of the things they express being or not the case. But, as 
Boghossian nicely puts it: ‘How could the mere fact that S means that 
p make it the case that S is true? Doesn’t it also have to be the case 
that p?’ (Boghossian 1997: 335).
Despite this apparent clash with (TT), many still hold that there 
is nothing objectionable with this notion of analyticity. Those who 
maintain it are thus left with two options: either (i) reject (TT) or 
(ii) interpret the notion of truth in virtue of meaning in a way that 
does not violate (TT). I will assume that option (i) is not viable: 
without some independent and principled way of rejecting (TT) such 
4 This is what Boghossian (1997) calls the ‘meaning-fact truism’.
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an option should be regarded as a non-starter. We are thus left with 
option (ii) if we want to defend the intelligibility of the metaphysical 
notion of analyticity. The question now is whether there is a way of 
making sense of this notion that does not violate (TT). My aim in the 
following sections is to explore such ways. I will argue that none is 
forthcoming.
3 Logical truths
Let us consider again statements (1) and (2) above. As we saw, (1) 
and (2) seem to be true in virtue of the same thing, namely, the 
meaning of the logical words ‘or’ and ‘not’. But if they are both true 
in virtue of the meaning of the logical words, does it follow that 
both statements are about the same thing, namely the meaning of 
‘or’ and ‘not’? Remember that according to (TT), a statement S is 
true iff (i) S means that p (or expresses the content that p) and (ii) p 
is the case. But if both statements (1) and (2) are true in virtue of the 
same fact: the meaning of ‘or’ and ‘not’, then they should express the 
same proposition or content (the p must be the same). However, they 
are about different things – (1) is about Brutus and Caesar and (2) 
is about snow – and thus cannot express the same proposition (the 
same p). To claim that they are true in virtue of the same thing – viz. 
the meaning of the logical words – seems to be in clear violation of 
(TT); and we have agreed to rule out any attempt to make sense of 
the metaphysical notion of analyticity that violates (TT).
To make this point a bit more vivid, let us consider the following 
Portuguese statement:
(2’)  Ou a neve é branca ou a neve não é branca.
This statement has the same meaning as (2) above, and it would be 
plainly wrong to translate it as having the same meaning as (1). In 
this case, statements (2) and (2’) are clearly true in virtue of the 
same thing, for they express the same content (the same p), and p is 
the case. But since (1) expresses a different proposition or content 
from the one expressed by (2) and (2’), it cannot be true in virtue of 
the same p obtaining, on pain of violating (TT).
At this point, a natural move to support the claim that logical 
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truths are true in virtue of their meaning alone would be to ap-
peal to the standard model-theoretic account of logical truth as truth 
under all interpretations that preserve logical form. We could then 
agree that (1) and (2) have different meanings, and maintain that 
what makes them true is the very same fact: the meaning of the logi-
cal words alone.
However, the fact that some truths are true under all interpreta-
tions that preserve their logical form does not show that what makes 
them true is the meaning of the logical words as opposed to the 
world.5 For, as we saw, (1) and (2) have different meanings, thus ex-
pressing different contents, and so, by (TT), must be true in virtue 
of those contents obtaining.6 Moreover, the fact that statements like 
(1) and (2) both share the following logical form,
(*) P or not P7
provides no reason to think that what makes then true is their logical 
form as opposed to the world. After all, logical forms can also tell us 
something about the world. For example, (*) could tell us that the 
world cannot be such that things could happen and not happen at the 
same time, or that we could have a certain fact and not have it at the 
same time. In this way we could claim that logical forms, somehow, 
represent the logical structure of the world.
To make this point vivid, take the following statement:
(5) Schrödinger’s cat is dead or is not dead.
5 See Williamson 2007:64 for a similar claim.
6 This is not to say that we cannot have different statements with different 
contents being true in virtue of the same thing. For example, the statements 
‘Snow is blue or water is H2O’ and ‘Snow is green or water is H2O’ express dif-
ferent propositions, but are both true in virtue of the same thing: water being 
H2O. But this is no counter-example to my claim, for they are still true in virtue 
of their contents obtaining.
7 Notice that we cannot say that what is true in virtue of its meaning alone is 
the general schema (*) rather than its instances, for (*) is not a statement and thus 
does not have a meaning.
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It is because (5) says something about the world that it poses a prob-
lem for our interpretation of quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, 
(5) is also an instance of (*), and so something that would be true, 
according to the metaphysical notion of analyticity, in virtue of its 
meaning alone. And if it were true in virtue of its meaning alone 
we would not even consider what it says about Schrödinger’s cat to 
determine its truth. Its truth would immediately follow from the 
meaning of its logical words. This is not, of course, to say that (5) 
could be false. We still think (or at least most of us) that (5) must 
be true. But this is not because of the meaning of its logical words, 
but rather because its logical form mirrors a certain modal struc-
ture of the world. Or consider Graham Priest’s dialetheism8 — i.e., 
the view that there are true contradictions. Priest appeals to several 
examples to argue that some statements of the form ‘Q and not-Q’ 
might be true. The intelligibility of his arguments crucially depends 
on the fact that the truth or falsity of logical statements is not entirely 
determined by the meaning of the logical words, but rather depends 
on the uniform assignment of meaning to each word in a statement 
in a given context. The fact that some truths are true under all in-
terpretation (or false under all interpretation) that preserves their 
logical form does not show that what makes them true (or false) is 
the meaning of the logical words as opposed to the world.  
Moreover, as Williamson 2007:64 notes, from the perspective of 
compositional semantics synthetic truths such as,
(6) Kripke is a philosopher or Kripke is not a man.
are true in the same way as logical truths like (1) and (2) are. Name-
ly, they are true because one of the disjuncts is true. So, if a state-
ment like (1) were truth in virtue of the meaning of its logical words 
alone, so would (6). But (6) is clearly not true in virtue of the mean-
ing of its logical words alone. Thus, (1) is also not true in virtue of 
the meaning of its logical words alone. What makes us think that 
it is true in virtue of its meaning alone is the fact that, contrary to 
(6), (1) expresses a necessary truth. But the fact that a statement ex-
presses a logically necessary truth in no way entails that it is true in 
8 See, e.g., Priest 1998.
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virtue of its meaning alone.9 Statements that express a logically nec-
essary truth (in the narrow sense) are statements that are true under 
all interpretations that preserve their logical form, and if this latter 
property cannot be used to elucidate the notion of truth in virtue of 
meaning alone, neither can the former.
What makes a statement true or false is what the statement is 
about. Or to use Aristotle’s famous dictum about truth: ‘to say of 
what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say 
of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true.’ Statements 
(1), (2), (5) and (6) are clearly about different things. Thus, they have 
different truth conditions. Their truth must, therefore, depend on 
whether such conditions are met. All statements are true, when they 
are, because their truth conditions are satisfied. And such truth con-
ditions result from a uniform assignment of meaning to each word 
in the statement in a given context. Logical truths are no different 
in this respect. The only difference is that logical truths are true 
under all interpretations that preserve their logical form. But this in 
no way means that they are true in virtue of the meaning of the logi-
cal words alone. Such truths are as much about the extra-linguistic 
world as any other truth – or at least as any other truth that is not 
explicitly semantic in nature.
Despite Quine being credit as the first to reject the metaphysical 
notion of analyticity, Bertrand Russell had already objected to a sim-
ilar notion. In Russell’s time the focus was not so much on meanings 
but rather on truths of thought, but the intuition was the very same 
– which is also the intuition present in Hume’s distinction between 
‘relations of ideas’ and ‘matters of fact’. The way Russell expresses 
his concern about this divide neatly illustrates the upshot so far:
The belief in the law of contradiction is a belief about things, not about 
thoughts. It is not, e.g., the belief that if we think a certain tree is a 
beech, we cannot at the same time think that it is not a beech; it is the 
belief that if a tree is a beech, it cannot at the same time be not a beech. 
9 The claim that necessary truths were true in virtue of their meaning alone 
was endorsed by the logical positivists, and rejected by Quine. But the logical 
positivists did not have independent means to show why this was so. The only 
reasons given to support such a claim result from their account of the a priori as 
knowledge of analytic truths, and of their subsequent identification of the con-
cept of a priority with that of necessity.
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(…) and although belief in the law of contradiction is a thought, the law 
of contradiction itself is not a thought, but a fact concerning things in 
the world. (Russell 1912: 50)
4 Conceptual truths
What about the paradigmatic examples of analytic truths, the so-
called conceptual truths, like ‘All bachelors are unmarried’, are such 
statements true in virtue of their meaning alone? The argument here 
seems to be even more straightforward than the argument regarding 
logical truths. If the statement ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is about 
bachelors and the property of being unmarried, how can it be true in 
virtue of its meaning alone?
Consider the following sentences:
(7) All bachelors are unmarried.
(8) All bachelors are healthy.
According to the metaphysical notion of analyticity, (7) is true in vir-
tue of its meaning alone, and (8) is true in virtue of both its meaning 
and the world (assuming that it is true). In both statements the word 
‘bachelors’ refers to bachelors, and not to the meaning of ‘bachelors’ 
(whatever that might be). And it is because the word ‘bachelor’ re-
fers to bachelors that (7) is about bachelors. But, by (TT), for (8) to 
be true in virtue of its meaning alone, the statement could not be 
about bachelors but about the meaning of ‘bachelors’. A statement in 
a context is about whatever its constituent terms refer to in that con-
text. But there is no relevant difference that would make ‘bachelors’ 
refer to bachelors in (8) and to the meaning of ‘bachelor’ (whatever 
that might be) in (7). But if (7) is about the fact that bachelors are 
unmarried, such a fact, no matter how trivial it might be, must be 
what makes it true.
Now contrast (7) with:
(9) ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ means that all bachelors are 
unmarried.
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If (7) were true in virtue of its meaning alone, the very same fact 
that made (7) true would made (9) true. But contrary to (7), (9) 
expresses a semantic truth, and thus must be about a different thing. 
But if these statements are about different things, by (TT), they can-
not be true in virtue of the same thing, namely the meaning of ‘All 
bachelors are unmarried’. Therefore, (7) cannot be true in virtue of 
its meaning alone.
I submit that if there is no other way of making sense of the met-
aphysical notion of analyticity such a notion should be rejected as 
incoherent. In the next section we will look at another way of under-
standing the metaphysical notion of analyticity.
5 Types of truth
A possible way of understanding the metaphysical notion of analytic-
ity would be to claim that the notion of truth in virtue of meaning 
alone is not so much about the truth-makers of analytic statements 
— meanings as opposed to ‘the facts’ — but about a special type of 
truth. In this way, claiming that analytic statements are true in vir-
tue of their meaning alone and synthetic statements true in virtue of 
the facts is to be understood as a claim regarding two different types 
of truth. So the question that we have to face now is whether there is 
such a thing as analytic truth and synthetic truth.
Williamson 2007:54-8 has presented a simple and very compel-
ling argument to show why there cannot be two distinct types of 
truth.
Williamson’s argument goes roughly as follows. If there were two 
distinct senses of truth, how could we determine the truth-value of, 
for example, a conditional in which the antecedent and the conse-
quent were both synthetic truths? We could say that in such cases 
the statement that would result from this application would also be 
synthetic and so true in the synthetic sense. But consider the follow-
ing statements:10
(10) Barbara is a barrister.
(11) Barbara is a lawyer.
10 I am using Williamson 2007 own examples.
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(10) and (11) are clear examples of synthetic truths, if true. Now 
imagine that Barbara is in fact a barrister, and consider the following 
conditional:
(12) If Barbara is a barrister, then Barbara is a lawyer.
If there are analytic truths, (12) should be one of them — ‘bar-
rister’ means a lawyer with special qualifications. However, (12) is 
composed of two synthetic truths. Does this mean that whenever 
we have a conditional with a synthetic truth for the antecedent and 
a synthetic truth for the consequent the result is an analytic truth? 
This is clearly false, as can be easily illustrated:
(13) If Barbara is a barrister, then Barbara is married.
What this shows is that if there are two senses of ‘true’ it would be 
impossible to work out the truth-table for something as simple as 
the material conditional. Whether a conditional is analytically true 
or synthetically true is not a function of its parts being analytically 
true or synthetically true. The best we could do is to claim that the 
material conditional would be analytically or synthetically true. But 
this would defeat the whole idea of distinct notions of truth. That is, 
we would in effect be claiming that there is such a thing as absolute 
truth. 
As Williamson 2007 also shows, we would have the same prob-
lem when considering the notion of truth-preservation. Valid argu-
ments preserve truth from premise(s) to conclusion. But if there are 
two distinct notions of truth, what type of truth is preserved? For 
example, we could have a valid argument with a synthetically true 
premise and an analytically true conclusion like the following:
 Snow is white.
 Snow is white or snow is not white.
It thus seems that we have once more failed to make sense of the 
metaphysical notion of analyticity. Is there any other way of making 
sense of this notion? In the next section I will consider one last idea.
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6 Analyticity and two-dimensionalism
Let me tentatively suggest a final way of making sense of the meta-
physical notion of analyticity.11 The two-dimensional framework ap-
proach to semantics has been understood and used in many differ-
ent ways, but there are some intuitions that seem common to all of 
them.12 One such intuition is the following:
(…) the truth value of an utterance will depend on facts in two dif-
ferent ways: first, the facts determine what is said; second, the facts 
determine whether what is said is true. (Stalnaker 2006: 295)
By accepting that the facts also determine whether what a statement 
says is true, the two-dimensional theorist embrace (TT), as they 
should. The claim that non-semantic facts also determine what is 
said is the one that I would like to focus on. Let us see if this could be 
used to make sense of the metaphysical notion of analyticity.
If we think of a possible world as a complete description of the 
facts, Stalnaker’s quotation above might be understood as referring 
to the two possible roles a possible world might play: that of (i) de-
termining what is said; and that of (ii) determining whether what is 
said is true. Now, a world that plays the role of determining what is 
said is considered to be the actual world. A world that is not actual is 
considered as counterfactual. The actual world is normally understood 
as ‘our world’ — that is, the way things are. And what determines 
the truth-value of a statement is the way things are. But there are 
ways things could have turned out so that what is true might have 
been false.
Consider the following example of a statement that expresses a 
contingent truth:
(P) Plato is the author of The Republic.
11 I am grateful to David Papineau for pressing me to think about how the 
two-dimensional account could be used to make sense of the metaphysical notion 
of analyticity.
12 It is not my purpose here to articulate and defend any two-dimensional 
approach, only to see if we can use some of its ideas to give a coherent account 
of the metaphysical notion of analyticity. For a discussion of the different inter-
pretations of the two-dimensional semantics apparatus, see Stalnaker 2006 and 
Chalmers 2006.
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By prefixing (P) with the ‘Actually’ operator we get the following 
statement:
(PA) Actually Plato is the author of The Republic.
The resulting sentence, (PA), now expresses a necessary truth – it 
is true at every possible world in which Plato is the author of The Re-
public at the actual world. This is the standard way of understanding 
the ‘Actually’ operator.
But it seems that there is a sense in which (PA) is not really neces-
sary, that there is something contingent about it. This is the intuition 
that the two-dimensional theorists want to capture, namely that ‘it 
is a contingent matter which possible world is actual’ (Davies 2006: 
143). Had a different possible world been actual (PA) could have ex-
pressed a falsehood. If another world in which Plato is not a philoso-
pher had been actual, (PA) would have been false.
Now consider the statement,
(W) Water is H2O. 
Following Kripke 1980 and Putnam 1975 we can claim that (W) ex-
presses a necessary truth, because ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ both refer rig-
idly to the same substance. However, had a different possible world 
been actual, (W) could have been false. For example, if instead of 
Earth we had Twin-Earth playing the role of the actual world, then 
‘Water’ would rigidly refer to that watery stuff that plays the water-
role on Twin Earth. ‘Water’ would then rigidly refer to XYZ, and 
(W) would have been false. So with Twin-Earth playing the role of 
the actual world, (W) is false.
Now consider the statement,
(WW)  Water is water.
Contrary to (W), this statement (WW) is true no matter what 
world is considered as the actual world. For, even if we had Twin 
Earth playing the role of the actual world, it would still be true that 
water is water — for XYZ is XYZ.
Corresponding to these two ways of understanding what is said 
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are said to be two distinct dimensions: on one dimension we have 
(A) different worlds considered as actual determining what is said; 
and on the other we have (C) different worlds considered as coun-
terfactual determining what is said. Dimension (C) corresponds to 
what David Chalmers calls ‘secondary intension’, and dimension (A) 
corresponds to he calls ‘primary intension’.13
Let us now see if this apparatus could help us make sense of the 
metaphysical notion of analyticity.
According to the metaphysical notion of analyticity a statement 
is true if and only if it is true in virtue of its meaning alone. We saw 
that two-dimensionalism embraces (TT): a statement S is true iff S 
means that p and p. However, if some statements are true no matter 
what world is considered actual, then, it might be claimed, they are 
somehow true in virtue of their meaning alone. After all, if a state-
ment is true regardless of how the world happens to be (regardless of 
which facts obtain), it seems that it is in some sense true in virtue of 
its meaning alone (though not literally so).
I submit a slightly modified version of the traditional metaphysi-
cal notion of analyticity, one that seems similar in spirit but without 
its shortcomings. Here is such a notion:
A statement is analytic (in the metaphysical sense) if and only if 
it is true at a world w regardless of whichever world is labelled as 
the actual world.
In the useful terminology of Martin Davies and Lloyd Humberstone 
1980, analytic statements have, thus, the property of being Fixedly 
Actually true.
Since a necessary truth, in the standard sense, is one that holds 
at all possible worlds, we might think that all necessary propositions 
are analytic in this metaphysical sense of analyticity, and, thus, that 
(W) is analytic, rendering this definition of analyticity unsuitable. 
However, this is not so. Statement (W) is not fixedly actually true: 
it does not hold at the actual world, regardless of whichever world is 
labelled as the actual world. But (WW) is fixedly actually true, and 
so analytic – and a priori –, as it should.
We could then claim that the only statements that are analytic in 
13 See, e. g., Chalmers 2006.
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this new metaphysical sense of analyticity are those that are know-
able a priori.14 Truths of mathematics and logic are all true in respect 
to the actual world, whichever world is labelled as actual. The same 
can be said of the paradigmatic examples of analytic truths, the so-
called conceptual truths. So, so far, so good.
Now, if an analytic statement in this metaphysical sense is one 
that is true no matter how the world turns out to be, it might seem 
that they do not impose any constraints on the world, and that is 
why we can know them to be true without having to look at the 
world – that is, a priori. Synthetic truths, on the other hand, do 
impose constraints on the world, and so they are somehow more 
world-demanding than analytic ones. It thus seem that we have fi-
nally found a robust enough notion of analyticity to be used in the 
empiricist account of the a priori. In the next section we will see why 
this is not so.
6.1 Is this new notion any good?
The first worry I would like to consider regarding this revised notion 
of metaphysical analyticity is whether it truly captures some special 
semantic phenomenon deserving of the label ‘analyticity’.
The analytic/synthetic distinction is a semantic distinction. The 
analytic statements, in the metaphysical sense, are the ones that are 
said to be true for semantic reasons alone, the synthetic statements 
the ones that are true for non-semantic reasons – they are supposed 
to be true in virtue of extra-linguistic facts, for they express, in Hu-
mean terms, ‘matters of fact’. Now, according to this revised notion 
of analyticity, analytic statements hold (when they do) in virtue of 
the facts, just as any other statement does. The difference is that they 
are true at every possible world considered as actual. Given this, one 
could claim that these statements are such that their meaning some-
how guarantees their truth, and hence that they are, to a certain ex-
tent, true in virtue of meaning (though not in a literal sense). How-
14 Peacocke 2004 claims that all propositions that are knowable a priori — 
those that are ‘contentually a priori’ in his terminology — are fixedly actually 
true. Notice, however, that Peacocke strongly rejects the metaphysical notion of 
analyticity as spurious.
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ever, this is not clearly so. The property that a statement has of being 
true no matter how the actual world turns out to be does not seem 
to be a purely semantic property, as the property of truth in virtue 
of meaning clearly is. It seems that if the phenomenon at stake in this 
new notion of analyticity were semantic, the same would be true of 
synthetic statements. Analytic statements are true no matter how the 
actual world turns out to be; and synthetic statements are not true no 
matter how the actual world turns out to be. But both statements are 
true in virtue of their disquotational truth conditions obtaining. The 
difference is that analytic statements, in this sense, will always have 
their truth conditions fulfilled and synthetic statements will have 
them only sometimes fulfilled. But then what is at stake here is a dis-
tinct type of necessity, rather than a distinct type of analyticity. And 
in fact, the ‘Fixedly Actually’ operator was introduced by Davies & 
Humberstone 1980 to express a different notion of necessity, what 
was called ‘deep necessity’ as opposed to ‘superficial necessity’, and 
not a notion of analyticity. The fact that a statement always manages 
to have their disquotational truth-conditions fulfilled does not show 
that the phenomenon behind it is merely semantic.
A second worry closely related to this one concerns the role that 
this purportedly metaphysical notion of analyticity can play in the 
empiricist account of the a priori. A priori knowledge is knowledge 
that is, in some suitable sense, independent of the subject’s sense ex-
perience. If possible, the a priori has the puzzling feature of provid-
ing us with knowledge about the world without causally relating us 
to it. The moderate empiricist way out of this puzzle is to claim that a 
priori knowledge, thought genuine enough in its own terms, is some-
how less substantial or less world-involving than a posteriori knowl-
edge. A priori knowledge is then said to be merely knowledge of 
analytic truths, and analytic truths understood as semantic in nature, 
as true in virtue of meaning alone, and so less substantial and cogni-
tively demanding than synthetic truths. The problem, as we saw, is 
that understood literally, we have to agree with Quine and reject this 
notion of analyticity. But understood less literally, as statements that 
are true no matter what world plays the role of the actual world, it is 
not at all clear that the notion can do the job the empiricists need it 
to do. For example, mathematical truths are true regardless of how 
the actual world turns out to be. But this fact does not provide any 
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reason to regard these truths as somehow less substantial than truths 
that do not hold fixedly actually, unless we already had independent 
reasons to think that all truths that hold fixedly actually are not sub-
stantial, or that mathematical truths are not substantial. Moreover, if 
we had independent reasons to think that mathematical truths were 
less substantial than empirical truths, or that truths that hold fixedly 
actually were less substantial than those that don’t, what would be 
doing the explanatory work would be such reasons themselves, and 
not this revised notion of metaphysical analyticity.
The dialectic so far is pretty straightforward. Either this pur-
ported notion of analyticity fails to capture a semantic phenomenon 
deserving of the name ‘analyticity’ or if it does capture it, it fails to 
do the explanatory job it was supposed to do. In either case, it should 
be rejected. This is not to say that the notion of fixedly actually true 
is irrelevant or philosophical uninteresting, quite the contrary. My 
only contention is in taking it as capturing a metaphysical notion of 
analyticity that could be used in an account of the a priori.
It is also worth noting that the identification of the notion of the a 
priori with this purportedly metaphysical notion of analyticity could 
lead us to prejudge some important questions. For example, some-
one could claim that the truth expressed by the statement ‘I exist’ is 
not a priori, say, because to know to exist I need to resort to some 
sort of introspective thought process that seems too analogous to 
sensory experience for it to be regarded as an a priori source of justi-
fication. But, if we were to identify the a priori with this purportedly 
metaphysical notion of analyticity, instead of addressing the question 
of whether we can know to exist through some a priori source of 
justification, we would claim that since this is fixedly actually true 
it must be a priori. But surely this is not the right way to go about 
determining the epistemic status of a statement.
For example, Chalmers takes ‘I exist’ to express an a posteriori 
truth. However, it is fixedly actually true, and so, it should count as 
a priori on this approach:
If S2 is ‘I exist’, then any utterance of the same expression with the same meaning will be true, so S2 has a necessary linguistic and se-mantic contextual intension [it holds Fixedly Actually]. But (somewhat 
controversially) S2 is a posteriori, justifiable only on the basis of experi-ence. […] All these cases are counterexamples to the Core Thesis [the 
thesis that identifies what is Fixedly Actually true with the a priori]. 
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All of them are a posteriori and cognitively significant, and many of 
them seem to be as cognitively significant as paradigmatic expressions 
of empirical knowledge. (Chalmers 2006: 70)
My concern here is not so much with whether we should count ‘I 
exist’ as expressing an a priori truth — for I think that it does. My 
concern here is with what two-dimensionalism has to offer as an 
explanation of the a priori. The aim is to explain the a priori. We 
do that by claiming that what is a priori is analytic in the sense of 
holding fixedly actually. We are then faced with what seems to be 
a counter-example, something that we take to be knowable a pos-
teriori but that is fixedly actually true. We then go on to adjust the 
theory in order to get a notion of analyticity that is coextensive with 
the notion of the a priori. Such an adjustment shows that we are us-
ing the a priori to test our notion of analyticity. And this is exactly 
the contrary of what we should be doing if the aim were to explain 
the a priori with the analytic.
Furthermore, it is not clear that we always know the proposition 
expressed by a statement that is fixedly actually true. For example, 
what is it that we know when we know that we exist? The statement 
‘I exist’ is true at every possible world, no matter what world plays 
the role of the actual world. But what I know when I know that I, 
myself, exists is not something that holds fixedly actually true. If I 
am right about this, this means that the identification of the a priori 
with this purported notion of analyticity is not only problematic but 
false, as there are things that hold fixedly actually that are not know-
able a priori. Of course, one could claim that all a priori truths are 
fixedly actually true – and that might well be true – but we would 
also need the converse to hold.15 That is, we would need all truths 
that hold fixedly actually to be knowable a priori for this notion to be 
coextensive with the a priori, as any purported notion of analyticity 
needs to be.
15 See, for example, Peacocke 2004, who claims that all a priori truths are 
necessary in this special sense, though not necessary in the metaphysical sense.
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7 Conclusion
I have explored several ways of making sense of the notion of truth in 
virtue of meaning (i.e., the metaphysical notion of analyticity); I ar-
gued that understood literally, the notion should be rejected. I then 
purposed a less literal way of understanding it. However, though in 
perfectly good order, it is not clear that this purported new notion 
of metaphysical analyticity captures a purely semantic phenomenon 
deserving of the label ‘analyticity’. And even if it does, it does not do 
the explanatory work required by the moderate empiricists. So, even 
if this new notion does capture a purely semantic phenomenon, this 
is not the kind of phenomenon that the metaphysical notion of ana-
lyticity is supposed to capture. Therefore, in either case, we should 
follow Quine in his repudiation of the metaphysical notion of analy-
ticity. This notion might well be the last dogma of empiricism.16
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